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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS TO PANEL 5
QUESTION.- I am extremely interested in Professor Kay's list of
noncoercive injuries. And I would like to pick up Professor Lay-
cock's point and be sure that his point gets added to your list; there
is a very important kind of noncoercive injury that comes when gov-
ernment tries to persuade people. I do not look on that as a light-
weight kind of harm, because another way of saying "persuasion" is
"indoctrination." And, especially in the arena of the public schools,
I believe that type of injury becomes a very serious kind of injury.
In Engel' and Schempp,2 the Supreme Court cases dealing with
prayer and Bible reading in the schools, the Supreme Court Justices
made a point of saying that they did not consider this kind of activ-
ity coercive. So presumably there would not be a Free Exercise
Clause issue there. And if coercion is also required to show an Es-
tablishment Clause violation, then there would not be protection
against this kind of harm.
I think we keep assuming, when we talk about injuries that the
Establishment Clause can cause, that we have two kinds of people:
we have the people whose religion is favored and those whose reli-
gion is disfavored. And those whose religion is favored, the harm to
them is maybe dilution or weakening of their religion; for others, the
harm is offense to them or humiliation or, the communication of a
message that they are outsiders. But it seems to me that we have
another class of people, and those are the uncommitted. And espe-
cially children who have not yet made their decision. And in our
society where religious choices are so fluid, people do change opin-
ions. So it seems to me there is harm in government attempting to
influence the religious decision at all. And if we do not call that
coercive, it is the kind of harm that is hard to detect; it is one of
those harms that the more severe it is, the harder it is to detect.
How do parents know how their children are being indoctrinated?
How do you measure that? And that is another reason why, when
you say: "Well, maybe it is not so bad in England; we just have this
1. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
2. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
little problem in the schools," to me it looms very large. I just want
to be sure that gets added to the list of noncoercive injuries. You
might even want to call that a form of coercion; and that may bear
on what we mean by religious freedom: we mean freedom to influ-
ence our own children, not let the government do that.
RICHARD KAY: There is little to disagree with in what you said.
If we have a difference, I suppose it is a classification question; it is
just a quibble. As to the kind of harm that arises when government
attempts to persuade, I think we can break it down into two differ-
ent kinds of injuries. On the one hand there is, as you said, the
persuasion which becomes indoctrination, which I would then essen-
tially assimilate under the idea of coercion. And I think the prayer
cases really could very easily be understood as coercion. And I have
not read the cases in a while but I thought that, in discussing the
effect of the opting-out part of the laws in those cases, that coercion
- indirect coercion - was an element of the decisions. And, inso-
far as we find no coercive influence, then I think it would fall under
one of the other categories that I mentioned and that Professor Lay-
cock mentioned about the other affronts which that kind of a speech
can effect. But as I say, this is just a question of your category and
mine; in substance, I agree.
MARK TUSHNET This picks up on something Professor Laycock
said, and also that came up earlier. It is something I have been
campaigning unsuccessfully about, but I should try it again. It is the
argument that: "Why not try it twice rather than once?" - or in
Professor Hartigan's version, I "give up on one of the branches of
government." The presentations of that argument are always one-
sided in giving the necessary cost/benefit analysis. The analysis
goes, the cost of giving judicial review up is that you are relinquish-
ing the chance of getting another institution to consider this. What
harm can come from that? And occasionally benefit can come.
There is a harm that can come from having judicial review. As
my comment indicates, legislatures can act mindlessly; courts have
to explain what they are doing. In Oregon, the imposition of the
requirement on the Native Americans was mindless; it communi-
cated nothing about the society's view of their practice. Justice
O'Connor writes an opinion explaining why, while we sort of regret
that we have to do this to you, the imperatives of the war on drugs
are so great as to overcome this burden that we are placing on your
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religion.3 Or even worse in Lyng,4 where the acknowledgement of
the harm to the religious interests is even more direct.
Similarly, it seems to me not irrelevant that Professor Laycock
says: "Justice O'Connor has the right test, but she never knows it
when she sees it." The origins of the endorsement test are in her
opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly.5 I do not need a Supreme Court Jus-
tice to get up there, using the authority of my government, to say I
am unreasonable in believing that a nativity scene communicates a
message of exclusion. She makes us think that a reasonable Jew
would not regard the communication as a message of exclusion. But
who is she to tell me that sort of thing? Given who the Justices are
likely to be, the chance of their articulating bad things about reli-
gion when they do the balancing is pretty high, and that is a cost
that has to be factored into this overall balance of the costs and
benefits of judicial review.
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK: I agree that some of the things the Court
says are outrageous, and its opinions can sometimes do real harm by
giving prominence and legitimacy to repressive or offensive views on
these issues. I am not sure you can eliminate that. You can make
that cost greater or smaller, but you can not get rid of it by simply
saying: Let's get the court out of this business. Cases are going to be
filed; and then, in the cases where they get out of the business, they
are going to say some outrageous things. And then in subsequent
cases looking for exceptions and loopholes and trying to chip away
at it, they are going to say some more outrageous things. Trying to
get out of these cases in Smith, the Court in effect said it is open
season on religious minorities, and a lot of lawyers for political ac-
tors are reading it exactly that way. Nothing they could say in the
course of entertaining a claim and then rejecting it would hurt
worse than that.
I do not have a whole lot of confidence in courts. But I have con-
siderably more confidence in courts than in state legislators and city
councils. There have been religious persecutions in this country.
There are localized persecutions right now. I am representing some
of those people. We have not gotten any of them off yet, although
we have gotten some judgments delayed, and we may accomplish
3. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 903-07 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
4. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
5. 465 U.S. 668, 688, 690-94 (1984).
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something more permanent. I can at least say the Hare Krishnas
are going to have a temple to worship in for two years longer than
they would have if we had not had a federal appeal to take.' Some
of these cases will be won, but many of them will be lost. There
have been periods in the past when a larger percentage of these
cases were won.
Even if the record is not all that good, there is no reason whatever
in my view to think that, on average, unpopular minorities will do
better with legislators than they will do with courts. That may just
be an empirical disagreement between the two of us.
DANIEL CONKLE: If I could add one comment. There are not just
legislators and there are not just federal courts; there are state
courts. And although the state courts are not overwhelmingly - for
example, on the Smith free exercise issues - moving away from the
United States Supreme Court, some are.7 So there is a path where
you have - depending on the way that they are elected or whether
they are appointed - at least somewhat politically detached judges
at the state court level who may have different views from the cur-
rent Supreme Court.
JOHN GARVEY: This is a question for Professor Kay. You asked,
"How would we do without the Establishment Clause?" And you
supposed that free exercise would take care of coercion. Then you
said there are two kinds of noncoercive harms. The second of these
was the problem of humiliation. The first you divided into (1)(A)
and (1)(B). (1)(A) was institutional harm to the church (and
maybe its members) of being degraded, or being in bed with govern-
ment, or changing its views from what they should be. (1)(B) was
the institutional harm to the government.
I want to ask you about (1)(B). I am not sure I know what it is. I
can see type (1)(A) harm to a church, measured by the church's
own standard or ideal of what to be or how to act. As an individual
I can relate to type (2) harm - humiliation. But in the case of
6. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. George, I1l S. Ct. 1299 (1991), vacat-
ing and remanding 262 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1989) (awarding a judgment of three million dollars,
more than five million dollars with interest added, that would have been collected by judicial sale
of all Krishna temples and monasteries). For the initial judgment on remand, see 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d
473 (1992) (remanding for new trial on punitive damages, and reinstating a judgment for
$1,837,500 in compensatory damages).
7. See, e.g., Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (1991), review
granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992); Minnesota v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990).
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(1)(B), of the harm to the government, is there some ideal form that
is broken when government deals with religion? Or are you talking
about the consequences that will follow from government dealing
too closely with religion? And if you are talking about conse-
quences, then aren't you talking about either coercion or type
(1)(A) or (2) harm?
RICHARD KAY. I think we can break it down this way. We can
talk about (1)(B)(1) and (1)(B)(2). First it may be that the associa-
tion which we are talking about may portend, in the long run, an
atmosphere in which the institutions, the political institutions, may
end up in activity which would be proscribable under a free exercise
rubric. So again, this might in fact go on the coercion side. As to
the second, you know, I am really not sure about it. I was picking
up on some of the things which have been said here by Professors
Marshall and Lupu. I do believe that the expression of this risk as-
sumes that there is some right way of governmental decisionmaking.
It involves a certain humility and tolerance to which an association
with religion may pose a risk. To the extent this is a serious fear,
then the Establishment Clause - again, it would certainly be an
indirect consequence - the Establishment Clause might be set
down as some kind of protection of that as well. But I think all of
the assumptions which you found lurking in that categorization are,
in fact, there.
WILLIAM MARSHALL: Professor Laycock, not surprisingly my
question is to you. I want to make my position clear if I did not
before, that I do not believe the Establishment Clause stands for the
proposition that religion cannot get involved in political issues. If in
fact it did, it would come in conflict with the Free Speech Clause
which would demand that the religious values be infused by whoever
wants to infuse them into the public dialogue. What I see the Estab-
lishment Clause standing for - or actually not the Establishment
Clause but this privatization theory - is that there should be a le-
gitimate rhetorical objection to be made when religion comes into
the public square. Now, if religion wants to recognize this objection
and then say: "Okay, we recognize this but we really need to come
in here because this is important!" as it frequently has in our politi-
cal history, then so be it. I was not going to comment on this be-
cause I thought it was fairly obvious what our differences were, but
you brought up the David Duke campaign, and as long as you did,
that is the perfect example. The man ran on the idea of bringing
19921
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Christian principles back into government. And he did not mask
that; he masked his racism, but he said outwardly: "This is just put-
ting Christian values back into government." I want the rhetorical
response still to be available when that kind of campaigning takes
place. I do not want this objection eliminated as a matter of consti-
tutional theory. In short, I think it is appropriate that, when religion
is used in that sort of way, that it is a legitimate criticism to say
that religion has got no place coming into the public square through
this kind of interplay. And I just want your response to that.
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK." "Religion has no place coming into the
public square," and "Religion has no place coming into the public
square in this kind of interplay," are profoundly different state-
ments. I do not know what you mean by "this kind of interplay."
And I suspect it would take us a lot of exchanges to work that all
out. But what "in this kind of interplay" adds is: There can be good
ways and bad ways, and we have got to do something about the bad
ways. I do not disagree with that.
But when you say, "Religion has no business coming into the pub-
lic square," I hear you making the Bruce Ackerman argument that
this is a state in which religious values cannot be considered and
should not be spoken out loud.8 I think that is preposterous. You say
you do not mean that, but that is what I hear without the qualifier.
With respect to the particular example of Duke, I think the re-
sponse that he drew from many religious leaders is far more effec-
tive as a political matter than your response: "This isn't Christian-
ity. You are a racist, Nazi phony trying to invoke the symbols and
language of Christianity; and that is not what our religion teaches.
This is not real Christianity." Simply as a political matter, you're
going to persuade more people with the religious response than with
the secularist response.
WILLIAM MARSHALL: Maybe, if you are fortunate enough to be
able to get that response in those particular circumstances. Now,
you have pointed out the supposed inconsistency in what I seem to
be saying. But if I may point back, if you admit that there is some
8. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN. SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980). I had thought
that Kathleen Sullivan took this position, but she disclaims it in the published version of her
paper. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 196
(1992). Her position is far from clear; I think she says that religious believers can make their
arguments but government can never act on them.
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legitimate concern with religious involvement in the public square,
then you must recognize that there is a problem.
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK I think there are good arguments and bad
arguments, right? And there are-good and bad religious arguments
and there are good and bad secular arguments. When the Catholic
bishops teach on social justice, I like what I hear although I think
they may go a little too far; when they teach on abortion, I say I
disagree. But I do not think their arguments are any more or less
acceptable in the public sector depending on whether I agree with
them or not.
Now, it may be that what you were principally thinking about is
something I am hardly thinking about at all, which is, people who
say: "Everyone should vote for candidate X or you'll go to hell."
Right? All right, if that is what you are concerned about, I agree
with you. That is an inappropriate form of argument; it is not an
argument we hear much; it is not an argument that is very effective
in a pluralistic society. I do not disagree, but I think it is such a tiny
slice of religious arguments that I . . . if you are confined to that,
then I think you have got to single that out and say that is what you
mean.
What I hear you saying and Ackerman saying is that it is illegiti-
mate to appeal to the religious basis of moral values. It is illegiti-
mate to say: "One reason for putting more money into the welfare
programs is the Sermon on the Mount and the values that are ex-
pressed there." No, that argument I find preposterous. And no cau-
tion flag goes up for me when I hear somebody make that argument.
EDWARD GAFFNEY: The last colloquy recalls the feeling of hu-
miliation that Professor Kay described as a noncoercive harm. One
of my difficulties with Professor Marshall's claim is that the feeling
of being humiliated is very subjective. I assume that many people
felt bad about many of the ugly racial comments that David Duke
made in his recent campaign to be governor of Louisiana. For exam-
ple, President Bush has told us how offended he was at some of
Duke's rhetoric. For someone who allowed his campaign to exploit
racial fear with the Willie Horton ads in the 1988 campaign, I sup-
pose that is saying a lot, but it does not get the analysis very far.
I would like to ask two questions of Professor Kay. First, is your
suggestion about noncoercive harms meant to be like one of those
emotional injury torts for which juries in California might award
lots of money, or is it meant to suggest some kind of a standard,
19921
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what do you do with the reluctance of the Court in cases like Valley
Forge to grant standing for what it has called "generalized
grievances?" 9
Second, would you please interact a bit more with Professor
Gilles? I would like to learn whether your knowledge of Canadian,
constitutional law would lead you to concur with her report about
the public funding of religious schools in the United Kingdom. For
example, has the Canadian practice of public funding of nongovern-
mental schools created a noncoercive harm or a negative impact
that we should be aware of on this side of the border?
RICHARD KAY: As to the second question, I really cannot help
you very much. I can say something else about funding of education
in Canada, but I do not know if it is responsive to your question.
Funding of religious education is fairly universal. One argument
which favors the situation we in the United States have, where there
is no funding, is that I know that in Canada it is a source of serious
contention and argument. It is also a fairly fruitful source of litiga-
tion. One of the more troublesome things about it is that, especially
in Quebec and Ontario, it tends to be associated with the linguistic
differences. So it kind of throws up another constitutional hook
which people who really have language and ethic differences can
latch on to. Now again, how serious is that? Is it worth the candle?
I leave that to you.
On the question of humiliation, what I was trying to suggest was
not really an identification of a standard of injury which then would
support litigation, but to talk, in general, about what benefits might
be reaped from the Establishment Clause, stripped of its coercive
aspects. To the extent that government association with religion is
reduced by Establishment Clause jurisprudence, even it is not elimi-
nated. I think, to that extent, the problem of feeling debased and
abashed by this government association is also reduced. And that is
something you lose if you give up on Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence altogether. Whether it is the principal purpose of it; whether
it again - I will say the same as I said last time - whether that is
enough to justify the jurisprudence altogether, that depends on the
cost. That is just the benefit side, it is one of the benefits; it depends
on what the cost is.
9. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
454 U.S. 464 (1982).
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QUESTION. I wanted to get at an Establishment Clause hypotheti-
cal by addressing the education issue. As Professor Gilles said, on
the one hand, you have the English situation in which there is direct
funding of religious schools, which clearly would not - and, I think,
should not - pass the establishment test. But on the other hand, in
our country we have a situation in which many people argue the
educational system has, in effect, served the sociological purpose
that the church once did; so now it is the focal point of unity. To the
point that, now, many Evangelicals and Fundamentalists feel the
way Catholics did in the 1840s and 1850s when Protestants told
them they were having a neutral public educational system. 10
And so on the one hand, you have got the idea of direct funding
of private education, which would not work. On the other hand, you
have a situation in which many people cannot feel comfortable in
putting their kids into the public school system because it promotes
an ethos which is contrary to some of their deepest religious convic-
tions, whether it is an indifferent ethos or sometimes perceived as an
antagonistic ethos to their deepest convictions.
Now, the alternatives that are increasingly gaining currency are
voucher-type schemes in which the arguments are: "Well, funding
will go not to the schools, as in England, and they won't go directly
into a governmental school system; but rather they'll go to the par-
ents of the school children, who can opt for the type of education
they wish." And the argument would be that would go to Jewish
parents and Fundamentalist parents and Missouri Synod Lutheran
parents and Catholic parents.
Now, my question is: Do you believe that type of funding - and
I think we are going to see it within the next ten or fifteen years; I
mean, it is going to happen, and I would expect it's going to be
litigated, perhaps under the Establishment Clause - do any of you
have any beliefs about whether that type of scheme would be a vio-
lation of the Establishment Clause? Because, although it is nondis-
criminatory, nevertheless I guess Jewish people would set up Jewish
schools and Marxists perhaps - if they can get together - would
set up Marxists schools and Fundamentalists would set up their
Fundamentalist schools.
DANIEL CONKLE: If you are asking what the United States Su-
preme Court would rule, my belief would be that the Supreme
10. See, e.g., DIANE RAVITCH, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS (1974).
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Court - depending on how the program was structured - would
probably approve it. It is not entirely clear from what the Supreme
Court has previously decided. But I think it is likely, given the di-
rection the Court has taken in previous cases - particularly Bowen
v. Kendrick" and some of the earlier parochial aid cases that ap-
proved tax deductions and credits for parents who sent their kids to
religious schools. It seems to me that the Court probably would ap-
prove it. Whether it would run into state constitutional problems
would be a separate issue, and the policy wisdom of vouchers, I
think, is a separate issue that I am not really prepared to comment
on.
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK: It would run into state constitutional
problems because nearly all the state constitutions have much more
explicit provisions, enacted during a wave of nineteenth-century
anti-Catholicism, that expressly talk about funds to sectarian
schools while preserving Protestant devotional services in the public
schools.1 2 So it might not be sufficient for the United States Su-
preme Court to say vouchers are okay. It might also have to say
vouchers are constitutionally required, which no court is likely to
say.
On the underlying policy matter, I part with most other separa-
tionists here. I would not allow the Christmas tree; I think it is an
establishment. But I would allow a voucher scheme if it were imple-
mented in a way that avoids the kinds of unfairness that Professor
Gilles described in the English system.
The existing system is a classic unconstitutional condition. The
state says to these people: "You have a constitutional right to a pri-
vate, religiously-affiliated education or you have a state constitu-
tional right to a free education, but you can't have both. You have
to choose. And if you want the religious education, you forfeit the
$2000 or the $4000 that the state is otherwise willing to spend on
educating your child."
If you want to think through the arguments about that, read Pro-
I1. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
12. For the history of these provisions, see 2 ANSON P. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE
UNITED STATES 69-70 (1950); CARL ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN CHURCH LAW §§ 62-66, at 75-80 (2d
ed. 1933). For typical state provisions, see CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 8; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, §5;
MASS. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, §2; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83; N.Y.
CONST. art. XI, § 3.
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fessor McConnell's article on school funding and abortion funding. 13
There is hardly anybody in the country with a consistent position on
those two issues. The pro-choice people tell us it is an unconstitu-
tional condition not to fund abortions for poor women, but it would
be an establishment to fund religious education for poor children.
Those two positions do not fit together. Funding cannot be a forbid-
den subsidy for education but a required part of the constitutional
right for abortion. The political right is equally inconsistent. These
issues are very hard, and few of us have thought them all the way
through.
SUSAN GILLES: I would like to address this issue from an English
point of view. I think you described two different schemes. One is an
opt-out scheme for those with (I presume you would say) conscien-
tious objections, as well as religious-based objections.
QUESTION: I would say for any reason whatever.
SUSAN GILLES: For any ideological reason?
QUESTION: Yes.
SUSAN GILLES: If you do that, I do not think you walk into es-
tablishment problems and you avoid the British problem of defining
what qualifies as a religion. But I do want to emphasize, having
grown up in a system which does separate school children based on
religion, you would have a cost there. You would have a loss of un-
derstanding of other religions. And one way to fix it, which is part
of the British idea, is to have compulsory religious education so eve-
rybody understands everybody else's religion. If you are going to
allow everyone to opt out, are you going to require people to under-
stand other's religions as part of the tolerance which we expect in
the United States?
QUESTION: I would like to pick up on something that Professor
Laycock said at the very beginning of his talk, in which he men-
tioned that the two clauses, the two religion clauses, should be inter-
preted as mutually supporting and interrelating. I would like to then
deal with that in terms of some of the things that Professor Bradley
said in the panel before, and the implications to the Establishment
Clause of the Smith decision and what happened in the free exercise
13. Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and Religious Schools,
104 HARV. L. REV. 989 (1991).
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scenario. And I would be pleased if someone could show me how the
scenario that I am about to describe is wrong because this is how I
see it progressing.
We have Justice Scalia fairly adamantly decrying the confusion
in the religion field - the seeming schizophrenia, the uncertainty of
doctrine, the confusion in this area. And there is an attempt to sort
of simplify this all, partially, in Smith. At the same time, we see
him joining Justice Rehnquist's decision in Jaffreel" on the Estab-
lishment Clause, trying to, in essence, simplify the history of the
Establishment Clause and hold it to that history. And he says -
this is Rehnquist - in its most simplified form, as we infuse mean-
ing into the Establishment Clause, it means that there should not be
a single national established church or there shall not be political
discrimination among the sects.
Then you see Smith, which says, "No constitutionally compelled
accommodations, but individual legislators can make separate ac-
commodations as they see fit. And if it affects some religions differ-
ently than others, that is the way the political cookie crumbles."
And so you would have a situation, for example, where there would
be an exemption for the use of wine for ritual sacraments, but
maybe not for the use of peyote for religious sacraments. That
would seem to me to fall into the very limited description, the his-
torical description, of the Establishment Clause set up in the Jaffree
decision - discrimination between sects.
Consequently, what I find is that even to avoid the schizophrenia
and the confusion, the simple historical description of the Establish-
ment Clause needs to be rejected for Smith to be able to be sus-
tained. Otherwise, we continue with the same confusion that Scalia
was talking about. No preference among sects must be rejected, and
we need to move to a situation where coercion - which is basically
the same type of thing as the Free Exercise Clause - coercion be-
comes the rule for the Establishment Clause. Because otherwise,
even in this very limited perspective of the Establishment Clause,
Smith becomes just as subject to the difficulties that Scalia is trying
to avoid as the earlier jurisprudence was.
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK. I think you are clearly right that, under the
14. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia
was not on the Court at the time of Jaffree, but he appears to have endorsed at least the general
thrust of Rehnquist's dissent in that case. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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regime of Smith, some religions will be allowed to practice either
because their practices do not get picked up by a majoritarian legis-
lature in the first place or because they secure exemptions. You are
right that other religions with seemingly analogous and indistin-
guishable practices will be picked up in the statute and will not get
exemptions and will not be allowed to practice. The Court is going
to have to deal with that and it is going to be messy.
The realist in me says they will deal with it largely by denying
the problem; they will always find that the two cases are distinguish-
able and there really isn't any discrimination. But they have got
that problem under free exercise and under equal protection as well
as under establishment. And certainly the victimized religion whose
practice is prohibited is being coerced; so cutting the Establishment
Clause back to coercion does not help solve the Court's problem. So
I guess I do not see how the Establishment Clause plays into your
question.
But I think the problem is a very real one; and there are going to
be cases about it. One of the cases I am involved in at the moment
is one of the ones I had mind when I said there are localized perse-
cutions going on: the set of ordinances in Hialeah that are carefully
drafted to protect kosher ritual slaughter but to outlaw Santaria rit-
ual sacrifice of small animals. The lower courts were wholly uninter-
ested in the rather obvious discrimination; I was surprised when the
Supreme Court said it might be interested.15 But Smith produces
that kind of problem: accepted groups get exemptions and unac-
cepted groups do not.
QUESTION: I guess this question is probably for Professor Lay-
cock, too. To what extent are you concerned about the expropriation
of government by religious organizations and then the acquiescence
of the governmental entity to that expropriation under the noncoer-
cive level that you were talking about?
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK: "Expropriation" meaning what?
QUESTION: The expropriation of governmental symbols or govern-
mental approval. The claims by religious entities that they have cer-
tain governmental blessings, either subtly or explicitly. And then the
concomitant actions or inaction by government against that. And
15. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467 (S.D. Fla.
1989), affid mer., 936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1472 (1992).
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that could be in the form of what Jerry Falwell used to do. It could
be in the form of a religious entity attempting to put up a symbol on
a public forum in front of a governmental office or whatever. And
then the government not doing anything to counter the impression
that may come about by that.
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK." Okay. One question that I've never thought
about, and one that I have. So let me talk about the second one.
The private placement of religious symbols on the public square
seems to me a fairly straightforward public forum problem, al-
though it has not been treated that way. If the government lets lots
of groups put up symbols there, then certainly religious groups
ought to be included. And I think the better policy is, the govern-
ment ought to let lots of groups set up symbols in some appropriate
place in the community. And I think if we did that, a whole lot of
this cr6che litigation would be solved. There is no reason for the city
government to put it up if the association of churches can put it up.
The other problem - the televangelist flying the flag and inter-
weaving patriotism and religion - is not one I have ever thought
about. Although I guess my instinct is: it is demeaning to religion,
but there are a lot of bad religions out there and there is not much
the government can or should do about it. Lots of secular groups do
the same sort of thing. It is probably protected by the Speech
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
QUESTION: I am not sure if this rises to the level of a question or
just an expression of a concern. But I will state it, and I guess any-
one on the panel can respond if they want to. It is related to what
the previous questioner asked about the standard in Smith where
Justice Scalia says, "If the locals pass a law and it incidentally in-
fringes on your religion, basically it's too bad for you because that
wasn't the intent of it." So you have that standard emerging from
the Court on the one hand.
And then, I will use for an example something that Dean Gaffney
said earlier, when he said about - I believe it was - the law school
association that passed a regulation that said you had to not dis-
criminate in hiring against anyone because of their sexual prefer-
ence; and this impacted on religious law schools who as a basic tenet
of their faith see homosexuality as a violation of that.
I guess I am trying to see how those two things can be reconciled.
And from my own perspective as a parent in a community in a mi-
nority religion, I have concerns as to how the oftentimes state-spon-
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sored legislation - which has a sort of common denominator ele-
ment to it - impacts on me and the way that I want to raise my
children when, if the defense that can be given is: "The state legisla-
ture passed it; so if it impacts on your religion, it's too bad," even
when it goes to something fundamental. But I want to issue to law-
yers a challenge. When preparing briefs and doing litigation, I think
there has to be some foresight to suggest remedies to judges and
courts that somehow make common sense and provide a right way
of reasoning to go forward from here. That makes a way for the
court to - if you want to say - do the right thing. Violating one
side against the other as little as possible. But I guess I would like to
know if anybody has any response to my concern.
DANIEL CONKLE: I share your concern. And I guess that my only
point is to state again that I think, at least for the United States
Supreme Court and other federal courts, I am very pessimistic as to
whether these kinds of claims will be taken seriously in the foresee-
able future. The other avenues of appeal are state courts and trying
to sensitize and educate legislators and local decisionmakers. I do
not know whether such efforts will be successful.
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK: Scalia's quite clear: it does not matter how
central or fundamental the religious obligation is. And keep in mind
the facts in Smith. This is a worship service. Suppression of a wor-
ship service raises no issue under the Constitution of the United
States and requires no justification. That is the law of the land at
the moment.
RICHARD KAY. I would like to add to that, so that we do not
leave with the wrong impression, that the result of that decision is
not that there can be no religious exemptions. As Professor Conkle
just pointed out, there are alternative avenues to pursue, both con-
stitutional in terms of state systems, and in terms of political re-
dress. Now, that might not avoid what we regard as an injustice in
every case. But it is not the situation that, by this opinion, all reli-
gious exemption was eliminated.
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